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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

W. & G. COMPANY, et

al.,

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY,
et al.,

Appeal No. 860539

Defendants/Appellants.
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
All of the parties are listed in the caption of the case.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by several Landowners in Block 57
of

the

downtown

Salt

Lake business

district

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, et al.,
Landowners sought and obtained

against

the

wherein said

from the District Court an

Order determining that certain ordinances adopted by the Salt
Lake City

Commission were

improper and, as a consequence

thereof, an injunction was issued enjoining the Redevelopment
Agency

from

condemning

any

of

the

Plaintiff's

properties

pursuant to the ordinances.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to the District Court on Motions
for Summary Judgment filed by both respective parties.
District

Court

denied

the

Defendants1

Motion

for

The

Partial

Summary Judgment and the District Court granted the Plain-

tiffs'

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment.

The

Court

determined that the Agency and Salt Lake City had failed to
comply with the requirements of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, determined that those requirements were jurisdictional in nature, and entered an Order that the Agency may not
acquire the Plaintiff's Block 57 properties by condemnation or
by threat thereof.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ISSUE I
IS THE LANDOWNERS' ACTION BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS?
ISSUE II
IS THE 'NOTICE' OF THE PUBLIC HEARING WHEREIN THE
ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WAS CONSIDERED SO
INADEQUATE AS TO DENY THE LANDOWNERS DUE PROCESS AND
CAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION TAKEN DURING SAID
MEETINGS TO BE NULL AND VOID?
ISSUE III
IS THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO
MAKE A PROPERTY-BY-PROPERTY SPECIFIC FINDING OF
"BLIGHT" OF EACH PARCEL WITHIN A PROJECT AREA?
ISSUE IV
WERE THE LANDOWNERS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY DETERMINATION THAT THE ORDINANCES IN QUESTION WERE ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT IN THEIR NATURE OR FORM?
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The

Appellants

seek

an

Order

reversing

the

District

Court's Order granting a partial summary judgment in favor of
the Landowners and denying the Appellants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-1 et seg.

The

Defendant, Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency, (hereinafter
AGENCY) is a duly created agency organized and functioning
under the provisions of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act.
The Plaintiffs are seven property owners having separate
interests

in real properties situated

in Block 57 of the

downtown business district of Salt Lake City, Utah (see map of
the properties, Exhibit

1 to Complaint

and Affidavits of

Plaintiffs D. Krantz, R. Nielson, R. Tannenbaum, J. Trapp and
E. Wolf, R. 27)
On February 4, 1971, the AGENCY adopted the "C.B.D. WEST
NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM" which originally'included a
project area of approximately 2\
Lake

City

business

district.

blocks of the downtown Salt
(Deposition

of M.

Chitwood,

Executive Director of the Redevelopment Agency, page 14) .

In

May of 1975, the AGENCY passed a Resolution to consider the
adoption of an ordinance amending the Plan to include an
additional 11 blocks of the downtown Salt Lake City business
district, including Block 57. (Deposition of M. Chitwood and
Second Affidavit of M. Chitwood, Exhibit B, R. 758). Accordingly, a Notice of Public Hearing of meetings scheduled before
the AGENCY to be held on July 31 and August 4, 1975 and before
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City on September 3,
1975, was mailed to each Landowner in the project area and was

duly published as required by law.

(Second Affidavit of M.

Chitwood, Exhibit C, R. 771-796).
Subsequent to said meetings, the Salt Lake City Board of
Commissioners, by Ordinance dated September 10, 1975 adopted
the C.B.D. NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PLAN, dated August 6, 1975
(Second Affidavit of M. Chitwood, Exhibit H, R. 842). A copy
of the Ordinance and Notice of its Adoption was mailed to each
Landowner in the project area on September 15, 1975 (Second
Affidavit

of M. Chitwood, Exhibit J, R. 870).

No action

contesting the Ordinance was filed by the Landowners until the
present matter was filed on February 14, 1985.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
IS THE PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS?
The Landowners below complained of inadequacies within
19 77 and 1982 Ordinances adopted by the AGENCY relative to
Block 57.

Those Ordinances are the yearly

implementation

plans of the previously described Redevelopment Plan of 1975.
The actual Plan under which the property in question became a
part of a redevelopment project occurred in 1975.

But even

under the best possible scenario from the Landowners1 position, this matter is clearly barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.
enactment

The Utah Legislature knew at the time of the

of the Redevelopment Act that once the detailed

process set forth in the Act and discussed hereinafter had
been followed by the Agency relative to the selection of a
4

"project

area",

preparation

of

a

"preliminary

plan"

for

redevelopment, and "public hearings" and meetings regarding
the same and the findings of "blight" by the Commission and
the adoption by "Ordinance" of a "redevelopment plan", that in
implementing

such

a plan a city would,

of necessity, be

obligating and committing itself in land acquisition and other
development activities to substantial expense, exposure, and
liability.

Therefore, to prevent the very type of claim that

has been filed here - one challenging the validity, sufficiency, and adequacy of ordinances adopted ten

years

prior to

filing of the lawsuit and after years of development activity
had occurred under the Redevelopment Plan, the Legislature
provided, by statute of limitation, that all such claims,
including those raised by the Landowners in this matter, are
jbarred

unless

raised

and

asserted

within

30

days*

from

publication of the Ordinance finding "blight" and adopting a
"redevelopment plan".
" . . . for a period of 30 days after publication of
the Ordinance adopting the redevelopment plan, any
person in interest may contest the regularity,
formality, or legality of the Ordinance. After the
30 day period, no person may contest the regularity,
formality or legality of the Ordinance for any cause
whatsoever.
(UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-20. Emphasis
added)
Because this case was not filed within the prescribed
time period for asserting said claims, the Complaint challeng* This Statute was enlarged to 60 days by amendment
effective June 1983, but in 1975, 1977 and 1982, the
30 day provision was applicable.

ing the sufficiency of the findings of "blight" within the
Ordinances and the request of the District Court to invalidate
such

findings

and

Ordinances

should

have

been

dismissed

summarily.
One cannot avoid a statute of limitations bar by asserting the claim as one for a Declaratory Judgment, as was done
in this case, and the Courts have uniformly held that where
the statute of limitations would bar a suit directly on the
merits, the statute of limitations would bar a Declaratory
Judgment as well.

Normally the statute of limitations does

not start to run in matters where a Declaratory Judgment is
sought until the "controversy" occurs.
Since no cause for Declaratory Relief accrues until
there is an actual controversy, the Statue of
Limitations does not begin to run until such
controversy occurs."
(22 Am Jur 2d "DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS" §78 Page 941)
But
filing

in cases where legislation provides

of

a

direct

challenge

as

for a timely

to the validity

of the

Ordinance, the statute of limitation commences to run at the
adoption of the Ordinance.
"Where a special Statute of Limitations applies to a
Special Statutory Proceeding, it will be applied
when a Declaratory Judgment is sought to achieve the
same result as the Special Proceeding." (22 Am Jur
2d "DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS" §78 Page 940-41)
In Campbell

v.

Nassau

County,

et al..

273 App. Div. 785

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) the New York Supreme Court held, in an
action which sought to declare void certain resolutions and an
Ordinance made and passed by Nassau County, that since the

6

Plaintiff did not file his Verified Complaint until 18 months
after

the Ordinance was adopted while the Civil Practice Act

required such contest to be made " . . . within 30 days from
the date of the adoption of the Ordinance . . . /'an action
in equity for a Declaratory Judgment could not be maintained.

In Sweetwater Valley Clinic Association
et

al..

v. National

City,

133 Cal.Rptr. 859, 555 P. 2d 1099 (Cal. 1976) the

National City Redevelopment Agency declared certain lands
"blighted" under a California Act basically similar to the
Utah Neighborhood Development Act.

In the California Act, a

similar statute of limitation provision is set forth, and the
Court, after setting forth the definition therein contained,
held:
". . .no Action attacking or otherwise questioning
the validity of .
any of the findings or
determinations of the Agency or legislative body . .
. shall be brought . . . after the elapse of 60 days
from and after the date of adoption of the Ordinance
adopting the plan. The negative implication of the
Statute of Limitation provision is that judicial
review of the findings is available when sought
within

the

60 day period."

This Court has noted

(555 P.2d at 1102-03)

the significance of such timely

filings and challenges to Redevelopment Ordinances.
Lake

County

v.

Murray

Redevelopment

Agency,

In

Salt

598 P. 2d 1339

(Utah 1979), this Court allowed a successful challenge to a
Redevelopment Agency's Ordinance, but made specific

notation

in the factual recital of the case that the matter had been

timely

filed.
"Plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing or file
written objections to the plan, but on October 8,

1976, it

filed

a Complaint in the District

Court of

Salt Lake County challenging the constitutionality
of the Act and charging that the plan and the
Ordinance adopting it are not in conformity with the
Act."
(598 P.2d at 1344.
Emphasis added.
The
Ordinance was enacted on September 8, 1976 and
published thereafter.)
Because this matter was not filed within the prescribed
and allowed period it should have been summarily dismissed and
the Trial Court erred in not doing so.
ISSUE II
IS THE 'NOTICE1 OF THE PUBLIC HEARING WHEREIN THE
ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WAS CONSIDERED SO
INADEQUATE AS TO DENY THE LANDOWNERS DUE PROCESS AND
CAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION TAKEN DURING SAID
MEETINGS TO BE NULL AND VOID?
The Landowners' argument is that the Notice of a Public
Hearing

prescribed

by

inadequate, ambiguous

the

UTAH

CODE ANNO.

or misleading.

§11-19-16

was

In support of that

position, they attached a copy of the "Notice" they challenged
as well as a copy of a letter of transmittal of that Notice,
both dated in May of 1982.

The fallacy of such a position is

that the pubic meetings in 1982. are not the public meetings at
which a legislative finding was made that the subject properties were located in a "blighted area".

After taking the

deposition of the executive director of the AGENCY on October
9, 1985, that fact, i.e.,

that the 1982 public meeting was not

the meeting in which the subject Ordinance being challenged
was passed, was known, unmistakably,

by the Landowners herein.

(See Chitwood Deposition pages 13-14).

Yet, notwithstanding

the Landowners' knowledge and understanding of that historical
8

fact,

they

nevertheless

persist

in

arguing

and,

indeed,

exclusively directing their challenges in the District Court
toward the 1982 public meetings, which is merely an annual
implementation proposal of a previously (1975) adopted Plan.
By such action the Landowners' attempt to diffuse the antiquity and untimeliness of this action by reducing

the gap

between the Ordinance and their filing a "declaratory judgment" regarding the same.
The content of the required Notice has been specifically
prescribed by statute:
"(1) Notice of the public hearing on a project area
redevelopment plan shall be given by publication not
less than once a week for four successive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation published in the
county in which the land lies. The notice shall:
(a) Describe specifically the boundaries
of the proposed redevelopment project
area; and
(b) State the day, hour and place in which
persons objecting to the proposed project
area redevelopment plan or denying the
existence of blight in the proposed
project area or denying the regularity of
any of the proceedings, may appear before
the legislative body and show cause why
the proposed plan should not be adopted."
(UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-16.)
The actual notice of the 1975 public meetings followed
precisely, the statutory requirements and, in pertinent part,
verJbatijn, the language the legislature mandated.

After giving

the full legal description of the properties affected by and
included within the proposed project area, the notice provided:
"Persons having objections to the proposed redevelopment plan or who deny the existence of blight in

the proposed project area, or the regularity of
prior proceedings, may appear at the hearing or may
file written objections prior to the hearing with
the Salt Lake City Recorder showing cause why the
proposed plan should not be adopted.
A copy of the proposed redevelopment plan with
amendments and modifications is on file for public
inspection in the office of the Salt Lake City
Planning Department, Room 414, City and County
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah." (R. 772)
The

proposed

redevelopment

plan

referred

to

in

the

written notice was kept on file and open to the public for
inspection for 10 days prior to the first public meeting (see
Second Affidavit M. Chitwood, Exhibit D, minutes of the Agency
meeting, paragraph 6, R. 798).
In that Plan, a "Statement of Development Objectives"
provides as follows:
"B.

It

Statement of Development Objectives
a.

Removal
of
structurally
substandard
buildings to permit the return of the
project area land to economic use and new
construction.

b.

Removal of impediments to land disposition
and development through assembly of land
into reasonably sized and shaped parcels
served by improved public utilities and
new community facilities.

c.

Rehabilitation of buildings to assure
sound long term economic activity in the
core area of the City." (R. 761)

further

provides

how

those

objectives

would

achieved:
"D.

Techniques to Achieve Plan Objectives
Activities contemplated in carrying out the
program in the Area include the acquisition,
clearance and redevelopment of those properties

10

be

shown in the Clearance and Redevelopment Area
on the Clearance and Redevelopment Map,
included as an exhibit and made a part of this
Plan, and the rehabilitation of other properties in the renewal area as shown on the
Clearance and Redevelopment Map." (R. 764)
No plans were made for "acquisition and clearance" in the
expanded area (which included Block 57) "during the first year
of the plan" but it is inconceivable that as a result of the
adoption of said Plan a property owner within the boundaries
of the project area would not comprehend and understand that
an ordinance adopting the 1975 C. B. D. Neighborhood Development Plan may subject his property, in subsequent years, to
acquisition and clearance for redevelopment purposes.
It is respectfully submitted that by giving the statutorily mandated

notice, verbatim,

and by

fully

advising the

public within the text of the proposed Plan of the ultimate
objective
"project

of acquisition of properties located within the
area", constitutionally

afforded each Landowner.

mandated

due

process was

Attestation of the reasonableness or

effectiveness of the "notice" can be found in the fact that
public attendance at the noticed meetings and their participation, input, hue and cry both for and against the adoption of
an amendment to the Plan was substantial!
Meetings, R. 797-815; 816-840.)

(See Minutes of

ISSUE III
IS THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO
MAKE A PROPERTY-BY-PROPERTY SPECIFIC FINDING OF
"BLIGHT" OF EACH PARCEL WITHIN A PROJECT AREA?
The gravamen of this Declaratory Action is the validity
of

the

"area"

concept

in

the

determination

of

"blight".

Succinctly stated, the Landowners argue that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act requires a property-by-property, lotby-lot,

parcel-by-parcel,

room-by-room*

evaluation

and, projected
of

property

to the absurd, a

or

buildings

to

be

included within a project "area" and a specific finding that
each

and

every

property,

lot,

parcel,

building,

or

room

thereof is "in fact" blighted.
It is conceded that no such individual "blight" analysis
was undertaken by the AGENCY.
of

"blight"

on

an

"area"

The AGENCY focused on the issue
basis,

looking

at

the

overall

condition of a limited geographic area which included parcels
in varying stages of deterioration or repair.

The Landowners

do not maintain that the "area" is not blighted, only that the
AGENCY did not specifically and separately find their individual buildings to be "blighted".

A careful scrutiny of the

Utah Neighborhood Development Act clearly indicates that the
legislature intended that Redevelopment Agencies consider the
*
While ostensibly this statement may appear as
argumentum ad horrendum,
the fact is that within
Block 57 are office structures which have been
converted to individual office condominiums, each of
which, under the Landowner interpretation of the
Act, require a specific finding of blight, literally
"room-by-room".
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existence of "blight" on an "area" basis-not an individual
building basis or on an individual component or room-by-room
basis

as

argued

by the Landowners.

In the definitional

portion of the Act, the following provisions appear.
"(8) 'Redevelopment1 means the planning, development , replanning, redesign, clearance, reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any combination of
these, of all or part of a project area,
and the
provisions of such residential, commercial, industrial, public, or other structures or spaces as may
be appropriate or necessary in the interest of the
general welfare, including recreational and other
facilities incidental or appurtenant to them.
Redevelopment includes:
(a) The alteration, improvement, modernization, reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any
combination of these, of existing structures in a

project area;
(b) Provision for open space types of use,
such as streets and other public grounds and space
around buildings, and public or private buildings,
structures and improvements, and improvements of
public or private recreation areas and other public
grounds;
(c) The replanning or redesign or original
development of undeveloped areas as to which either
of the following conditions exist:
(i) The areas are stagnant or improperly
utilized because of defective or inadequate street
layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size,
shape, accessibility, or usefulness, or for other
causes; or
(ii) The areas require replanning and land
assembly for reclamation or development in the
interest of the general welfare.
Redevelopment shall include and encourage the
continuance of existing buildings or uses whose
demolition and rebuilding or change of use are not
deemed essential to the development,
redevelopment
or rehabilitation of the area.%%
UTAH CODE ANNO.
§11-19-21 (emphasis added).
In describing "blight" the statute consistently refers
exclusively to "area" or "areas" and not
"(9) A 'blighted
intended to be used

individual parcels.

area'
is an area used or
for residential, commercial,

industrial, or other purposes or any combination of
such uses which is characterized by two or more of
the following factors:
*

*

*

(10) 'Project area'
means an area of a community which is a blighted area within a designated
redevelopment survey area,
the redevelopment of
which is necessary to effectuate the public purposes
declared in this chapter and which is selected by
the redevelopment agency pursuant to this chapter.
(11) 'Redevelopment survey area' means an area
of a community designated by resolution of the
legislative body or the governing body of the agency
for study by the agency to determine if a redevelopment project or projects within the area
are
feasible.
(12) 'Redevelopment plan' means a plan developed by the agency and adopted by ordinance of the
governing body of a community to guide and control
redevelopment undertakings in a specific redevelopment project area."
UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-21 (9),
(10), (11), (12), (emphasis added).
The legislature expressly provided that a "blighted area"
is one which

is

"characterized
and

not,

by"

certain

evidenced

blight

as Plaintiffs

restricted

to certain types of buildings.

factors which

would

argue, are

Moreover, the required findings by the legislative body
to become part of the ordinance are not required to be parcelby-parcel but, by statute, are designated to be on an "area"
basis.
"(5) The
findings
and determinations
of the
legislative body based upon fact that:
(a) The project area is a blighted area, the
redevelopment of which is necessary to effectuate
the public purposes declared in this act."
UTAH
CODE ANNO. §11-19-21.
There is not one single usage of the word "blight" in the
Utah Neighborhood Development Act which is not modified by
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"area" within the same sentence.
tal,

but

That is not just coinciden-

is consistent with the entire

concept of urban

renewal, which, by its very nature requires the dealing with
properties and parcels as a "group" or "area" and not individually.
Challenges to the "area" concept of finding and dealing
with "blight" by redevelopment are not new, but they have been
consistently rejected as antithetical to the concept of urban
renewal.
It must be borne in mind that the determination of the
existence of "blight" and the desirability of redevelopment
are

"political"

and

"public

policy"

questions

which

are

reserved by and repose exclusively with the legislative body.
Therefore, the public hearings attendant the adoption of the
Redevelopment Project Plans are not "trial-type hearings" but
are merely legislatively created public hearings which are
restricted in scope and formality specifically by the statute
under which they are proscribed:
"It seems plain that so far as the investigation of
the matter of blight is concerned, the demands of
due process did not call for a hearing at all.
David Jeffrey
Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
267 Wis.
559, 66 N.W.2d 362, 380 (Sup.Ct.1954); Robinette
v.
Chicago Land Clearance
Commission,
115 F.Supp. 669,
672 (D.C.I11. 1951).
That determination might
constitutionally have been left for ex parte action
by the governing body or the planning board.
Of
course, the Legislature in its discretion may, as
was done here, lay down a mandate for a particular
type of hearing. In this event/ the procedure must
be followed. But having in mind the nature of the
public use involved and the fact that ordinarily the
subject matter of the hearing is within the legislative domain, the language employed should be

scrutinized carefully to determine if the lawmakers
intended to yield the normal prerogative and
function of their branch of the government.
The argument that a trial type hearing was
intended is predicated largely upon the direction,
in section 6, supra, that among other factors, the
board f shall consider * * * any evidence
which may
be adduced in support of the objections, * *.f The
idea is that the word 'evidence1 connotes proof
conforming to the rules of evidence applicable to a
judicial proceeding and submitted through the avenue
of direct and cross examination in the formal
setting of a trial type hearing. But a doctrinaire
formalism cannot be applied in the consideration of
a problem like this.
The legislative intent can
only be gathered by a study of the entire enactment.
The significance of the word 'evidence1 must then be
drawn from its position and association in the
framework fashioned by the makers.
As has been shown above, investigation or study of
the desirability of acquiring private property for
public use, as well as the decision to take, are
preliminary matters which have always been regarded
as legislative in character and not subject to the
hearing requirements of due process. If this were
not so, government could not function effectively.
We must assume that the Legislature, in adopting the
Blighted Area Act, knew the state of the law and the
difference between a legislative and a judicial
hearing. No sound argument can be made that, when
the Legislature in writing the section directed the
planning board to consider 'any, and all, written
objections that may be filed,' it intended to limit
the proof to facts admissible under the rules of
evidence.
The very words 'any, and all,' clearly
point away from such a conclusion. The mandate to
consider such objections is followed immediately by
the crucial language 'and [shall consider] any
evidence which may be adduced * * *.' In context,
it would be inconsistent and illogical to say that
this clause contemplates a judicial hearing.
The
embracive word 'any' before 'evidence' 'manifests a
design to permit the introduction of any factual
data or argument which an objector feels bears upon
his position and the question to be reported upon by
the board.
The purpose is to give objecting
property owners unlimited and unhampered scope in
the presentation of material which they deem to be
in support of their opposition. The language fairly
breathes such an objective. Note that the board is
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ordered to consider any and all written
'objections'
and fany evidence which may be adduced in support
of

the objections*

'

The imposition of a duty on a legislative agency
to receive and consider evidence in connection with
a hearing provided for in a statute, does not per se
signify that the hearing is to be of the trial
type."
Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837,
851-52 (1958) is one which is "characterized by" certain
factors which evidenced blight and not, as Plaintiffs
would argue, are restricted
to certain types of buildings.
Moreover, the required findings by the legislative body
to become part of the ordinance are not required to be parcelby-parcel but, by statute, are designated to be on an "area"
basis.
"(5) The
findings and determinations
of the
legislative body based upon fact that:
(a) The project area is a blighted area, the
redevelopment of which is necessary to effectuate
the public purposes declared in this act."
UTAH
CODE ANNO. §11-19-21.
A.

Scope of Judicial Review of "Blight"
It is important to note at the outset, concerning the

issue of the existence or nonexistence of "blight", the Courts
have consistently determined that such questions are "political" and "public policy" matters which are the exclusive and
sole province of the legislature.

The Court's inquiry is

restricted to whether or not the legislature was "guilty of
bad

faith or arbitrary or capricious action", and not to

review whether, in the Courtfs opinion, the area is in fact
"blighted".
Tampa,

(See Girubstein

v.

Urban Renewal

115 So. 2d 274, 748 (1959).

Agency

of City

of

"It has been the uniform holding of these courts
that the designation of the area to be taken for the
renewal project is a legislative function, political
in nature, and that the function of the court is
limited to ascertaining whether or not the function
has been exercised in a legal manner and that there
has been no fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious
action." R. B. Davis et al.,
Appellants,
v. City
of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 712 (Tex. 1959).
11

In passing both the Blighting Ordinance and the
Development Ordinance, the Board of Aldermen acted
in its legislative capacity. We are bound by the
ligatures of review to a determination of whether
the action was arbitrary, the result of fraud,
collusion, or bad faith, or whether the City
exceeded its power. The issue of whether a legislative determination of blight is arbitrary turns upon
the facts of each case. And, the burden of proving
that it is arbitrary is on the party so charging."
Maryland Plaza Development
v. Greenberg,
594 S.W.2d
284, 287 (Mo. App. 1979) (citations omitted).
The landmark case involving the question and validity of
the area blight concept is the decision by Justice Douglas in
Berman v. Parker,

346 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27

(1954) wherein the Court held:
"In the present case, Congress and its authorized
agencies attack the problem of the blighted parts of
the community on an area rather than on a structureby-structure basis.
That, too, is opposed by
appellants. They maintain that since their building
does not imperil health or safety nor contribute to
the making of a slum or a blighted area, it cannot
be swept into a redevelopment plan by the mere
dictum of the Planning Commission or the Commissioners. The particular uses to be made of the land
in the project were determined with regard to the
needs of the particular community.
The experts
concluded that if the community were to be healthy,
if it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum
area, as though possessed of a congenital disease,
the area must be planned as a whole.
It was not
enough, they believed, to remove existing buildings
that were insanitary or unsightly. It was important
to redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the
conditions that cause slums - the overcrowding of
dwellings, the lack of parks, the lack of adequate
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streets and alleys, the absence of recreational
areas, the lack of light and air, the presence of
outmoded street patterns. It was believed that the
piecemeal approach, the removal of individual
structures that were offensive, would be only a
palliative. The entire area needed redesigning so
that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed
for the region, including not only new homes but
also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping
centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of
decay of the area could be controlled and the birth
of future slums prevented. * * * Such diversification in future use is plainly relevant to the
maintenance of the desired housing standards and
therefore within congressional power.
* * * Property may of course be taken for this
redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending. But we have said enough to
indicate that it is the need of the area as a whole
which Congress and its agencies are evaluating. If
owner after owner were permitted to resist these
redevelopment programs on the ground that his
particular property was not being used against the
public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer greatly.
The argument pressed on us
is, indeed, a plea to substitute the landowner's
standard of the public need for the standard
prescribed by Congress.
But as we have already
stated, community redevelopment programs need not,
by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal
basis - lot by lot, building by building.
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size
of a particular project area. Once the question of
the public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and
the need for a particular tract to complete the
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
legislative branch." 346 U.S. at 34-36.
Berman

has been cited and followed universally by every

Court which has considered the "area" vs. "parcel-by-parcel"
issue.

In Wilson

v.

City

of Long Branch,

142 A.2d 837, (N.J.

1958) the Court cited the Berman text above and held:
"Denial of the right of the municipality to draw
within a blighted area certain houses or buildings

which are in good condition, would be in some
instances to defeat the overall legislative purpose,
namely, the redevelopment of blighted areas."
142 A.2d at 849.
See also the following cases:
"If the Project plan, as a whole, is valid, then the
inclusion therein of sound structures or vacant land
does not necessarily invalidate the Project. This
is so because the purpose of the Urban Renewal Law
is to transform an entire slum area into a wholesome
section of the community; and to deny to the city
the right to include within the area certain houses
or buildings in good condition would, in some
instances, defeat the over-all purpose of the
statute and the Project.
Thus, it is universally
held that if an area as a whole is subject to
clearance and rehabilitation, the condition of a
single structure located therein is immaterial."
Grubstein
v. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Tampa,
115 So.2d 745, 748 (1958).
"Plaintiff's property is a sound and safe structure.
It is to be taken by the Authority only because it
is within the slum area as defined in the plan.
Plaintiff accordingly argues that even if the
Authority may condemn and raze sub-standard structures, it may not lawfully take and destroy a
building that is neither sub-standard nor unsanitary.
This argument overlooks the fact that in condemning property to eliminate a slum the act requires
the Authority to deal with an area,
not with
separate individual buildings.
The test of the
existence of a slum is the substantial preponderance
of unsafe and unsanitary structures in the area.
That the application of this test bears hardly upon
an owner of sound property is undoubtedly true; but
hardship may always exist when the power of eminent
domain is exercised. The legislature has determined
that the feasible method of accomplishing slum
clearance is by clearing an area; and we cannot say
that such a determination is manifestly unreason-

able."

Randolph

v.

Wilmington

Housing

Authority,

139 A.2d 476, 484 (Dela. 1958)."
V. May a standard building within a slum area be
taken for the project?
Appellant Johnson takes the position that, in any
event, his property may not be taken because the
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structure located upon his property is standard and
meets the minimum requirements of the City's
building code.
[9] The answer to the contention, according to
the uniform holdings of the highest courts of other
states and of the Supreme Court of the United
States, is that in condemning property to eliminate
a slum, the act requires the city to deal with an
area, not with separate individual holdings. One of
the major tests of the existence of a slum is the
substantial preponderance of unsafe and unsanitary
structures in the area.
The Legislature has
determined that the feasible method of accomplishing
slum clearance is by clearing an area, and we cannot
say that such a determination is manifestly unreasonable.
The extensive annotation in the American Law
Reports, reviewing the many cases on this point,
states:
'One point which does appear to be firmly
established * * *is that under the
statutory 'area concept,f whereby whole
areas are selected for redevelopment, the
statute will not be invalidated, nor will
the particular projects be held illegal,
f
because some properties within the
area'
are by no means substandard or blighted.'
The principle was recognized by this Court in the
Dallas Housing Authority case where it was said:
'When the use is public, the necessity or
expediency of appropriating any particular
property is not a subject of judicial
cognizance.'"
R. B. Davis

v.

City

of Lubbock,

326 S.W.2d 699, 710-

11 (Tex. 1959).
" It is to be noted that the plaintiff Velishka's
property is not blighted property and it is urged
that the act thereby allows the power of eminent
domain to be employed for uses inconsistent with the
purposes of the act. The intent of the act was to
acquire and prevent recurrence of 'blighted
areas.'
Experience has shown and the facts of this case
indicate that the area must be treated as a unit and
that a particular building either within or near the
blighted area may have to be included to accomplish
the purposes of the act. It is not necessary that
every building in such an area be in a blighted

condition before the whole area may be condemned.
It is sufficient that the taking as a whole is
reasonably necessary to the clearance of blighted
areas and prevention of their recurrence."
Miller
v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 475 (Wash. 1963).

B.

Effective*s11-19-9 on the "Area" Concept of Redevelopment
The

Utah

Neighborhood

Development

Act

provides

as

follows:
"A project area must be restricted to buildings,
improvements, or lands which are detrimental or
inimical to the public health, safety, or welfare."
(§11-19-9).
The Landowners argue that the inclusion within the Act of
Section 9 requires the AGENCY to find "blight" on an individual property basis and is legislative abandonment or repudiation

of

the

"area"

concepts heretofore

discussed.

Said

argument fails for two reasons:
1.

To construe §11-19-9 as an abandonment of the "area"

concept of blight and redevelopment is diametrically contrary
to every other statutory reference to "blight" and "redevelopment" in the Act; and,
2.

§11-19-9 does not address the issue of "blight" but

is far less restrictive.
This

Court,

in

interpreting

and

construing

the Utah

Neighborhood Development Act must do so liberally so as to
affect the objects and purpose of the statute:
"The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of the state. The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their
22

provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to affect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice."
(UTAH CODE ANNO. §68-3-2).
See also Stanford

Transportation

Co. v. Davis,

9 Utah 2d

184, 341 p.2d 207 (1959).
11

It may be noted from the above that the legislative purpose in enacting the related 1949 statutes
was not solely to provide for slum clearance. It
was to authorize the public agencies to function for
slum clearance and urban, suburban and rural
redevelopment, to acquire land for that purpose and
to make it available for redevelopment by private
enterprise or by public agencies in accordance with
approved redevelopment plans. Another purpose was
to authorize cooperation with and the obtaining of
funds from federal agencies.
Obviously these
enactments are in pari materia
and warrant liberal
judicial construction in order to effectuate the
beneficent legislative design."
57 N.J. 506, 274
A.2d 1, 4 (1971).
Since

every

single

reference

to

"redevelopment"

and

"blight" within the Act is couched in terms of "area", it is
clear that the legislature recognized the principles of Berman
and

the

decisions

which

Redevelopment can only

followed

that

case,

i.e.,

that

be accomplished by dealing with the

problem of its existence and the treatment of the problem on
an "area" concept.

Moreover, examination of Section 9 reveals

that the word "blight" does not appear within said Section,
even though the Landowners argue that that's what the legislature meant to say.
had

intended

to

It is submitted that if the legislature

provide,

as

the

Landowners

argue,

that

ff

blight" must exist in every single piece or foot of property

included within a redevelopment project area, then Section 9
should

have read

as follows:

"A project area must be restricted to buildings,
improvements, or lands which are
blighted."
However, the legislature did not use the word "blight" at
all in Section 9, but, instead, used a far less restrictive
definition by requiring that the property not be within the
project area unless it was " . . .

detrimental or inimicable

to the public health, safety, or welfare."
Consistently the Landowners below argued and convinced
the District Court that the Act required a specific "blight"
finding
provision.

as

to

each

property; but

the Act makes no

such

The "area" must be "blighted" and the area must

include buildings or property which, if not included, would be
detrimental or inimicable to the health, safety, or "welfare".
What is in the public's "welfare" is far less restrictive than
the necessity to find property "blighted".
Parker,
The

See, Berman

v.

348 U.S. 26, 99 L.Ed. 27, 75 S.Ct. 98 (1954).
Landowners

interpretation

that

each

and

every

property or building within a project area must be found to be
blighted is also blatantly contradictory with the definition
of an indicia of "blight" as provided within the Act:
"(9) A 'blighted' area is an area used or
intended to be used for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other purposes or any combination of
such uses which is characterized by two or more of
the following factors:
(a) Defective design and character of physical
construction,
(b) Faulty interior arrangement and exterior
spacing,
(c) High density of population and overcrowding,
(d) inadequate
provision
for ventilation,
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light, sanitation, open spaces, and recreation
facilities,
(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, dilapidation, mixed character, or shifting of uses.
(f) Economic dislocation, deterioration, or
disuse, resulting from faulty planning,
(g) Subdividing and sale of lots of irregular
form and shape and inadequate size for proper
usefulness and development,
(h) Laying out of lots in disregard of the
contours and other physical characteristics of the
ground and surrounding conditions,
(i) Existence of inadequate streets, open
spaces, and utilities, and
(j) Existence of lots or other areas which are
subject to being submerged by water."
UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-2(9)(a)-(j).
An "area" that has two or more of the above "characteristics" is, by definition, "blighted".
(b) , (d) , (e) , and

Only subsections (a),

(f) refer or describe conditions which

customarily exist or are attendant older buildings.
tions described

in subsections

Condi-

(c) , (g) , (h) , (i) or

(j)

indicate factors which have nothing to do with the physical
condition of any individual building or property.

Hypothe-

tically, a brand new building could be within a "blighted"
area because

it is surrounded

or serviced by

"inadequate

streets, open spaces, and utilities", (subsection (i)), and is
"laid out on a lot of irregular form and shape", (subsection
(h)).
ISSUE IV
WERE THE LANDOWNERS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY DETERMINATION THAT THE ORDINANCES IN QUESTION WERE ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT IN THEIR NATURE OR FORM?
Under the restricted review powers of the District Court
to review and pass upon the finding of "blight" (see Scope of

Judicial Review herein),

it is clear that the

finding of

"blight" by the Salt Lake City Commission in 1975 was amply
supported by competent evidence and was, therefore, neither
arbitrary nor capricious in any manner.
The evidence in this case is that in April, 1975, the
planning department of Salt Lake City conducted a building by
building survey of all of the properties located within the
proposed project area.

Those findings were summarized in a

Report to the C. B. D. Neighborhood Development Plan which was
presented at the public hearings in 1975 wherein the question
as to the adoption of the subject project area was considered.
Examination of that report indicates that there was substantial evidence on which a finding that the area was blighted
could reasonably have been made by the legislative body:
"
Physical:
In April, 1975, the Planning
Department conducted an external condition survey of
the expanded NDP downtown area. The survey measured
conditions for buildings and street improvements
including sidewalks, curb and gutters, street,
alleys, etc.
In addition, lots without structures
were identified by use.
Each building was evaluated in terms of its
foundation, exterior walls, windows, doors, stairways, and trim features.
Using these measurement
categories each building was categorized into one of
four condition classes: satisfactory, minor repair
required, major repair required, and beyond repair.
A building established upon a foundation which
is settled or is deflected or is bulging to an
extent where it has a severe negative impact on the
exterior walls above it was considered to be
economically beyond repair.
Five percent of the
buildings in the expanded NDP area (12 buildings)
were identified as having this condition.
An exterior wall which is bulging or is out of
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plumb also causes the building involved to be deemed
economically beyond repair.
A building which has a foundation with severe
erosion, holes, or cracks or an exterior wall with
cracked, rotted, or worn bricks or severe water
stains was scheduled for rehabilitation.
Broken
windows, sashes, or sashes out of square or missing;
doors with frames broken or missing also were
elements noted which show a need for rehabilitation.
In total, 94 buildings or 43% of the NDP structures
were identified as requiring rehabilitation.
The remaining 99 target area buildings were
identified as either satisfactory or as needing
minor repair. Forty-six of these need minor repair
while 53 are satisfactory according to our study.
Minor repair is defined as painting, pointing,
patching, etc., needed for foundations or exterior
walls; painting, repairing or glazing windows;
painting or repairing doors; painting, repairing or
replacing exterior stairways; and painting, repairing or replacing building trim features.
In addition to the 22 buildings identified and
classified, there were 19 lots without structures.
All 19 are parking lots. Thirteen are hardsurfaced
while the remaining 6 are not.
Street improvement conditions were noted for
each property location.
For 19 properties the
sidewalk condition was shown to have drainage
problems. In 69 cases the sidewalk was identified
as broken, missing or uneven. In 45 of the property
areas the sidewalk was noted to have cracks.
Seventy-five cases were noted to be in good condition.
Poor drainage was noted to be the problem for
19 sections of curb and gutter development. Broken,
missing or uneven places were identified for 28
more.
Eighty-three curb and gutter sections were
judged to have minor problems while 67 were judged
to be in good shape.
Street problems were noted for 9 percent of the
entries. Nine entries or 4 percent were noted to be
high crown streets.
Eleven entries or 5 percent
were shown to be in a broken or uneven condition.
One hundred and twenty-eight street entries noted
minor cracks. The remaining 61 were deemed to be
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high crown streets.
Eleven entries or 5 percent
were shown to be in a broken or uneven condition.
One hundred and twenty-eight street entries noted
minor cracks. The remaining 61 were deemed to be
satisfactory.
(Second Affidavit of Michael Chitwood, Exhibit H, Pages 1 and 2 R. 853-54).
In addition, an economic evaluation was made concerning
the proposed redevelopment area and examination of the report
further concludes that the legislative body considered those
factors:
11

Economic:
The economic analysis of the Urban
Renewal Plan is based upon the basic data found in
two economic studies.
These studies are:
"Final
Report, Economic and Market Analysis, Central
Business District West, Neighborhood Development
Program"
prepared by Development Research Associates, 1972; and This is a Community?
Salt Lake
City, 1971 prepared by Claron E. Nelson, Ph.D.,
Department of Economics, University of Utah."
(Second Affidavit of Michael Chitwood, Exhibit H,
Page 3, R. 855).
The finding of "blight" in the project area is a legislative finding, based upon facts and evidence considered by the
legislative body.

Having made that determination, it is not

the prerogative of the Court to pass judgment on the wisdom or
validity

of

Development

such

(See Davis,

findings.

and Berman,

Maryland,

Plaza

supra).
CONCLUSION

A

challenge

property blighted
limitations.

of

the

Ordinance

is barred

by the

declaring
applicable

the

subject

statute of

The Notice to Landowners of the public meetings

wherein blight was presented was sufficient and cannot be held
as a matter of law to be so inadequate as to constitute a
denial of due process.

The Agency is not required by statute

28

to make a property by property specific finding of blight of
each parcel within the project area, but is required merely to
include only those buildings which are detrimental, inimicable
or harmful to the public health, safety and welfare.

The

Landowners did not establish facts sufficient to allow the
Court to enter a summary determination that the Ordinances in
question were arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent in their
nature or form.
RESPECTFULLY submitted,

&.

Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants
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